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Abstract
This paper analyzes the potential impacts of energy pricing on efficiency, equity and sustainability in
groundwater use. The analysis uses empirical data on water productivity in agriculture for crops, dairying and farms
for north Gujarat, east US and south Bihar. For north Gujarat, the analysis uses data from well owners who pay flat
rate tariff, and well owners who pay pro-rata tariff. For eastern UP and south Bihar, the analysis uses data from well
owners and water buyers from diesel and electric well commands. The analysis also compares data from diesel well
owners and electric well owners in south Bihar. The findings are as follows:
Introducing marginal cost for electricity motivates farmers to use water more efficiently at the farm level
through careful use of irrigation water; use of better agronomic inputs; optimize costly inputs; optimize livestock
composition and carefully select crops and cropping patterns, which give higher return from every unit of water and
grow low water consuming crops. It also shows that higher cost of irrigation water (because of higher energy cost)
will not lower net return from every unit of water used as the farmers will modify their farming system accordingly.
Further, change in the structure of power tariff from flat rate to pro-rata will not have any adverse effects on
access and equity in groundwater use. Nor will it increase the monopoly power of well owners. The number of
potential water sellers and not the number of potential buyers of water govern the price of water. Pro-rata pricing
reduces cost of groundwater pumping per unit of land. It also reduces aggregate pumping, which is disproportionately
higher than the reduction in net returns per unit of land. This leads to more sustainable groundwater use.
This means that in water scarce regions, it would be possible for farmers to maintain net farm surpluses at
higher energy tariff by improving productivity of water use. The empirical evidence further reinforces that the
arguments against pro-rata pricing are flawed. Raising power tariff in the farm sector to achieve efficiency, equity and
sustainability in groundwater use is socially and economically viable.
1. INTRODUCTION
In arid and semi-arid regions of India, groundwater withdrawal for crop production exceeds the average
annual recharge (Kumar, 2007). Uncontrolled withdrawal of groundwater for crop production, supported by
subsidized electricity in the farm sector, leads to fast decline of water level in many parts of country.  The alluvial
areas of north Gujarat in western India, and hard rock areas of peninsular and central India are some such
examples3.
As irrigation is the main user of groundwater in India, raising water productivity in the ground water
irrigated areas is essential for reducing groundwater draft (Amarasinghe et al., 2004; Kumar, 2005; Kumar,
2007). Many Indian states are contemplating re-introduction of electricity metering in the farm sector, to manage
groundwater demand. The basic premise is that at higher power tariff, with induced marginal cost of electricity
and water, the farmers will improve water use efficiency (Kumar and Singh, 2001; Kumar, 2005) and enhanced
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water productivity. Such proposals face fierce resistance from farmers’ lobby. Further, political parties and
scholars alike argue that it will lead to a collapse of farmers in many water-scarce regions due to reduced net
farm returns, making electricity metering in farm sector socially and economically unviable.
Agriculture accounted for almost 29% of the total power consumption in India in 2001-02 (GoI, 2002).
Electricity to the farm sector in India is subsidised under both flat rate and pro-rata tariff systems. The subsidy
in terms of sale to agricultural consumers is estimated to have increased from Rs. 15586 crores in 1996-97 to
Rs. 30462 crores in 2000-01. This is because of increasing use of electricity for groundwater pumping, which
in turn increase groundwater draft4. In most of the states, farmers pay electricity charges based on connected
load and not on the basis of units of power consumed. Some of the Indian states are providing electricity to farm
sector free of cost. Due to poor financial condition of the State Electricity Boards, they fail to supply good
quality power to the agriculture sector. Pricing of electricity, in which the charge paid by farmers does not
reflect actual consumption creates incentive for inefficient and unsustainable use of both power and groundwater
(Kumar, 2005; Kumar and Singh, 2001).
While metering appears to be a solution to the problem, researchers question its viability on 3 grounds:
1] transaction cost of metering is very high, which increases the cost of supply of electricity, thereby reducing
net social welfare (Shah et al., 2004); and 2] tariff levels at which electricity and water demand curve becomes
elastic to price changes would be so high that it becomes socio-economically viable (Saleth, 1997); and 3]
political opposition to metering is so high that governments shy away from the option.
A recent research by Kumar (2005) questions the validity of the first two arguments. Empirical evidence
shows that with higher tariffs, the farmers use water more efficiently (by providing lower dosages to the crop),
increase gross water productivity (Rs/m3); and secure higher returns per unit of water used. They are motivated
to allocate more water for less water-consuming water efficient crops, provided they receive high quality,
sustained water supply.
Some scholars cite positive impact of flat rate pricing of electricity on access and equity of groundwater
(for instance, Shah, 1993). They argue that with competitive water markets, water prices are kept low with the
result that a major share of the electricity subsidy benefits are transferred to water buyers. However, the zero
marginal cost of production of water from wells does not seem to influence the prices at which water is traded,
in favour of buyers of water for irrigation. A recent research shows that flat rate pricing increases the monopoly
power of large well owners (Kumar, Singh and Singh, 2001). Also, flat rate pricing leads to inequitable distribution
of power subsidy benefits among well owners (Kumar and Singh, 2001; Howes and Murugai, 2003). Kumar
(2007), on the basis of evidence from Mussafarpur in Bihar argued that the monopoly power enjoyed by water
sellers cannot be reduced by pricing policies, but by improving the transferability of groundwater.
As a way to cope with the increasing financial burden due to revenue losses through subsidies and
growing power deficits, the State Electricity Boards in many agriculturally prosperous states have introduced
heavy cuts in power supply hours to the farm sector (GoI, 2002)5. They assume that this would reduce the
energy use and groundwater draft for agriculture. There is no evidence to support this logic. The electricity
boards have not analyzed the impact of such cuts on equity in access and efficiency in use of groundwater. On
the contrary, with reduction in hours of power supply, the quality of irrigation can be adversely affected6. The
economic prospects of irrigated farming are more elastic to quality of irrigation water rather than its cost (Kumar
and Patel, 1995; Kumar and Singh, 2001). The rich well owners always find ways to overcome the crisis of
power cuts. This can further increase their monopoly in water trading.
4 Due to subsidised power supply to agriculture sector, the annual losses to State Electricity Board are estimated to be Rs. 26000
crore and it is growing with a compound growth rate of 26 per cent per annum.
5 In the hard rock areas of Gujarat, farmers are unable to run their pump for 6-8 hours continuously due to lack of water availability
in the wells and higher rate of drawdown, resulting farmers are forced to run tube wells only for a 2-3 hours at a time and stop
pumpfor 3-4 hours to accumulate water in the well.
6 Due to interruptions in power supply accompanied by poor quality of power, farmers do not have absolute control over irrigation
water. Under this situation, they show increasing tendency to over irrigate the crops when electricity is available. Water delivery
often does not coincide with the critical stages of watering of crops. The result is that they are getting less output per unit of
irrigation water.415
Nevertheless, there are some positive developments in some states in the recent past. Since 2001, the
government of Gujarat had only provided metered connections for agriculture. Nearly 12,000 farmers are already
having metered power connections in north Gujarat alone. Here, farmers pay Rs.0.7/kwhr for electricity consumed.
In Orissa, which is agriculturally one of the most backward states, electricity supply to farmers is through
villages electricity co-operatives, known as Vidyut Sanghs, which does metering and billing. The agency does
metering at the feeder level, and charges to the co-operatives. Studies on the impact of such policy interventions
in promoting efficiency, access equity and sustainability in resource use are lacking.
2. OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESIS
The overall objective of the study is to analyze the socio-economic viability of pro-rata pricing of
electricity in agriculture. Specific objectives are: 1] to study the impact of change in mode of electricity pricing
on efficiency and sustainability of groundwater use by well owners; 2] to analyze the overall impact of electricity
pricing on the farming system of well owners, including the economic prospects of farming; and, 3] to analyze
the impact of change in mode of electricity pricing on the functioning of water markets.
The major hypothesis tested in this study is that with mounting cost of energy used for groundwater
pumping, farmer would use energy and groundwater water more efficiently; shift their cropping system towards
water efficient and high valued crops, take higher farming risks, thereby overcoming the potential negative
impacts.
3. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Study Area
North Gujarat, which is a water scarce region and the
eastern plain regions of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which are water
rich regions constitute the geographical area for the present study.
The semi arid north Gujarat region receives a mean
annual rainfall of 735 mm. Grey brown, coastal alluvium types
of soils are found in this regions The mean annual precipitation
in the eastern plain region of Uttar Pradesh is about 1025 mm
and the region’s climate varies from dry sub-humid to moist
sub-humid. The soil types in this sub-zone is light alluvial and
calcareous clay.
The Patna district falls under the south Bihar plains;
receives a mean annual rainfall of 1103 mm and climate condition
of region varies from dry to moist sub-humid. The soil types
found in the region are old alluvium sandy loam to clayey and
the larger areas under the Tal and Diara.
3.2 Sampling Procedure and Data Collection
Primary and secondary data relating to crop and livestock production was obtained. The primary data
included: quantum of crop inputs and outputs and their prices; cropping pattern; electricity prices; diesel
consumption and price; well command area; number of water buyers and sellers; quantum of livestock inputs
(dry and green fodder, feed, drinking water) and outputs, and unit price of inputs and outputs.
The districts of Mirzapur and Varanasi were selected from Bihar  and Uttar Pradesh for the study. Five
contiguous villages were selected for primary survey to draw the required sample for diesel and electric well
owners, and water buyers. The sample size was 60 electric pump owners, 60 diesel pump owners, 60 water









Figure 1: Geo graphical Coverage of Study416
Two talukas - Palanpur and Vadgam of Banaskantha district were selected from north Gujarat. Samples
of 120 farmers who have metered electricity connection were obtained from 29 villages for data collection. Of
this, 60 electric pump owners who paid power tariff on the basis of the connected load, and remaining 60
electric pump owners paid power tariff on the basis of actual consumption of electricity.
In south Bihar, Patna, Maner and Danapur development blocks were selected for primary survey. From
each block, one village was selected. Thus, the two villages selected were Baluan and Hathiyakand. The sample
farmers of the Baluan village were dependent on diesel pumps whereas in Hathiyakand, farmers are dependent on
electric pumps. From Baluan village, 60 diesel pump owners and 60 water-purchasing counterparts were selected.
Likewise, from Hathiyakand, 60 electric pump owners and their water purchasing counterparts were selected.
The detail of sample size is given in Table 1.
Water Scarce
North Gujarat Banaskantha 60 - 60 - - - 120
Water Rich
Eastern UP Varanasi and
Mirzapur 60 60 - - 60 60 240
South Bihar Patna 60 60 - - 60 60 240
Total 180 120 60 - 120 120 600























3.3.1 Analysing the Efficiency and Sustainability Impacts of Change in Mode of Pricing
There are very few locations in India where farmers pay for electricity based on consumption. Gujarat
is one such state. Therefore, to analyze the potential impacts of introducing pro-rata pricing of electricity in farm
sector, with marginal cost of using groundwater, the farmers who are using diesel pumps for well irrigation and
water buyers are used as proxy for pro-rata tariff.
The price of electricity used for pumping groundwater influences water productivity in many different
ways (Kumar, 2005). The efficiency impacts change in mode of pricing by comparing water productivity of
crops in physical terms. We can examine the impact of change in mode of pricing on economic viability of
farming by comparing the overall water productivity of crops, livestock and farming system under the two
conditions. The sustainability impacts of price changes can be analyzed by looking at the changes in groundwater
withdrawal by well owning farmers.
In the study, we only consider the applied (pumped) water for estimation of water productivity at the
field and farming system level, and not the depleted water that takes into account the contribution of rainfall to
total water input to the crop and return flows into groundwater. This does not disturb the inferences drawn from
the study due to three reasons: i] we are concerned with the changes in water productivity in the same field or
farm, which means that the level of use of rainfall by the crop does not change. If rainfall use increases, it will
not change the recharge to groundwater.
Return flows would be insignificant in semi-arid north Gujarat due to deep water table conditions.
However, return flows from irrigation can be quite significant in both Uttar Pradesh and Bihar plains due to
alluvial geology and sub-humid climatic conditions. The farmers in this region would be concerned with the total417
amount of water applied rather than the actual amount of water depleted. The reason is that applied water would
determine the amount of energy required to pump groundwater, which is scarce in the regions. The farmers in
these two regions will not be concerned with reducing the depleted water per se, as it is in abundance.
3.3.2 Estimating Water Productivity of Farming System
The physical water productivity for a given crop (kg/m3) will be estimated using data on crop yield and
the estimated volume of water applied for all sample farmers growing that crop. The combined physical and
economic water productivity in Rs/m3 is estimated using data on net returns from crop production in Rs/ha and
estimated volume of water in cubic meter. To estimate the net income from a particular crop, the data on inputs
for each crop was obtained by primary survey of farmers. This included cost of seed, labour, fertilizer, pesticides
and insecticides, irrigation, ploughing, harvesting and threshing.
The physical productivity of water in milk production for livestock   (lt/m
3
) can be defined as:
   …………………………………….… (1)
Where,    is the average daily milk output by one unit of livestock category over the entire live cycle
(lt/animal/day).    is the total volume of water used per animal per day, including the water embedded in feed
and fodder inputs, used in dairying for an animal in a day, worked out for the entire animal life cycle (m3/animal/
day). It is estimated as:
  ……..…………. (2) (Singh, 2004; Kumar, 2007)
Where  ,   and   are the average quantities of cattle feed, dry fodder and green fodder used for feeding
a livestock unit per day (kg/animal/day); ,   and   are the physical productivities (kg/m
3
) of cattle
feed, dry fodder and green fodder, respectively;   is the daily drinking water consumption by livestock (m
3
/
day). It is the average volume of water required by a dairy animal per day over its entire life cycle, including the
water embedded in feed and fodder.
,  ,   and   for a given category of livestock would be estimated for the entire life cycle
of the animal from the following: i] weighted average of the average daily figures of these inputs for each season
for animals in different stages of the life cycle, viz., calving, lactation stage, dry stage; and ii] the time period in
each stage of animal life cycle for that category of life stock.
Since all the farmers in the sample may not have animals that represent all the different stages of the life
cycle in a particular category of livestock at a given point of time, the average values of inputs are worked out as
value of above mentioned variables for the sample farmers. Likewise, the average values of physical productivity
of water in green fodder and dry fodder are used for estimation.   (lt/animal/day) is estimated from: i] the
weighted average of average daily figures of milk yield for different seasons; and ii] the ratio of time period in
lactation and the average life span of the animal in that category.418
 and  is estimated by taking their respective quantities and the volume of water required for
growing that crop. In the case of by-products of crops used as fodder, the water used for growing that crop is
allocated as the main product and by product in proportion to the market prices of the respective (Singh, 2004).
The net return of milk production,  (Rs/animal/day) is estimated using values of  , the price
of milk (Rs/litre) and the cost of production of the average amount of cattle inputs required in a day (Rs/animal/
day) estimated for the entire animal life cycle as proposed by Singh (2004) and Kumar (2007). It is important to
mention here that with import of green or dry fodder in a farm, the cost of fodder input could also go up. This
in turn would affect net water productivity in dairying   (Rs/m
3
). It can be estimated as:
 ……………………………….………. (3) (Singh, 2004; Kumar, 2007)
In the case of purchase of inputs market price is used. If the inputs are from the farmers' own fields, the
actual cost of production is estimated. If farmer uses crop by-products for dairying, the total cost of production
of the given crop is allocated among the main product and by-product on the basis of the potential revenues that
can be earned from their sale. The quantity of inputs (feed and dry and green fodder) and milk outputs are
worked out for the entire animal life cycle and not on the basis of the actual use of inputs and milk yield at the
point under consideration.
The total volume of water used for milk production annually by one unit of livestock   (m
3
/animal/
annum) is estimated by dividing the total annual milk production by one unit of livestock (  ) by the physical
productivity of water in milk production ( ).
The water productivity of the farm    (Rs/m
3
), including crops and dairy is estimated as:
 ………………….…… (4)
Here,   is the water productivity of main product of cropi;    is the total volume of water used for
crop i;   is water productivity in dairy production for livestock type  ; and   is the volume of
water used for dairy production per animal for livestock category  .    is the total number of livestock in
category  
3.3.3 Impacts of Different Modes of Energy Pricing on Equity in Access to Groundwater
The equity impact of different modes of energy pricing on groundwater use is analyzed by comparing
the water charges (Rs/m3) paid by the water buyers under the flat rate and unit pricing of electricity against the
cost (Rs/m3) farmers have to incur for access to groundwater if he decides to have his own well under both
situations i.e., flat rate and unit pricing. For this, data was collected on: [i] water charges paid by water buyers
under both the tariff regimes; [ii] cost of installation of bore/tube well; [iii] energy charges under flat and unit
pricing paid by farmers annually; [iv] the land holding size; and, [v] well repair and maintenance cost.419
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Distribution of Land Holdings
The average size of land holding of different categories of farmers in the study area is provided in Table
2. In north Gujarat, the average size of land holding is higher for tube well owner who are paying power tariff on
connected load basis (3.79 ha) as compared to their counterparts having metered connection (3.28 ha). About
90% of the area is under irrigated crop production and remaining 10% area is cultivated under rain-fed condition.
In eastern Uttar Pradesh, the average size of land holding is larger for diesel well commands as compared
to electric well commands. Differences are significant between well owners and water buyers. Diesel pump
owners have average land holding size of 1.35 ha while their water buyers have landholding size of 0.94 ha. The
average size of land holding for electric pump owner is 1.30 ha, whereas their water buyers have an average land
holding size of 0.56 ha.
In south Bihar like eastern Uttar Pradesh, the average size of land holdings for both well owners and
water buyers in the diesel pump commands is higher than that of their counterparts in electric pump commands.
The well owners in electric well commands have larger sized holdings (0.73 ha) as compared to their water
buyers (0.53 ha). In diesel pump commands, the differences are larger. The average size of land holding of well
owner here is 1.26 ha, whereas for water buyers it is 0.57 ha.
From the data presented in Table 2, it is also clear that in the average size of land holding in water
abundant eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar plains is much smaller compared to water scarce north Gujarat.
This is one of the important factors for utilizing available water resources. In case of water abundant region, the
limited land availability should motivate farmers to maximize returns per unit of land. Against this, in water
scarce region, water availability is a limiting factor for maximizing returns from crop production, and hence
generally, they would be motivated to maximize the returns from every unit of water (Kumar et al., 2008).
However, lack of resources for investing in wells and energizing devices is a limiting factor for many farmers in
south Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh to access the water, which is available in plenty.
North Gujarat Banaskantha 2.95 (0.33) 3.45 (0.34) NA NA
Well Owner Water Buyer
Eastern Varanasi and
Uttar Pradesh Mirzapur 1.30 0.560 1.35 0.940
South Bihar Plains Patna 0.730 0.530 1.260 0.570





Electric Pump  Diesel pump
Unit Pricing Flat Rate Well owner Water buyers
4.2 Cost of Groundwater Irrigation
The cost of groundwater irrigation was estimated for well owners by taking into account the following:
1] cost of well construction and pump set installation; 2] cost of obtaining power connection; 3] cost of
operational and maintenance of the well and the pump set; 4] life of the well and the pump set; 5] the average
hours of groundwater pumping per year; and 6] discharge of the pump set. In the case of electric wells with
metered connections, the hourly operation cost is worked out using the energy charges per kwhr of use.
Similarly, in the case of diesel wells, the operation cost was worked out using the price of one litre of diesel and
the amount of diesel consumption per hour of running. The cost of irrigation was finally worked out per cubic
metre of water using well output data. In the case of wells with flat rate electricity connection, the implicit cost
per hour of irrigation is worked out using the annualized cost, and the number of hours of irrigation per annum.420
Based on the figures of well discharge, cost estimates were worked out for western Uttar Pradesh, northern
Gujarat and south Bihar and are presented in the Table 3 The unit rates charged by diesel pump owners for
irrigation services are much higher than that of electric pump owners. Check figures for Gujarat.
4.3 Area Allocated by Farmers for Different Crops in Eastern Uttar Pradesh
The cropping pattern of well owners and water buyers under different modes of energy pricing i.e.,
connected load (electric well) and unit consumption (diesel well) in eastern Uttar Pradesh  is presented in Table
4. The crops grown in the study villages are food-grains, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables, cash crops and fodder
crops. Paddy and wheat are the dominant crops. During the kharif season, well owners and water buyers under
both energy regimes allocate larger portion their land holding under paddy. It is because of the high rainfall,
which can meet a large part of the crop water requirement.
In diesel well commands, pump owners allocate about 26% of the gross cropped area under paddy
cultivation, whereas in the case of water buyers, it is only 22%. In electric well commands, pump owners
allocate 11.51% to paddy and water buyers allocate about 14.8% to paddy. Electric pump owners also grow
groundnut. Water buyers in both electric and diesel well commands allocate larger portion of the gross cropped
area under green fodder and other vegetables during kharif season as compared to pump owners. Water buyers
in diesel well commands grow Arhar. Whereas water buyers in electric well commands grow lady’s finger.
Major crops grown during winter season are wheat and barley, potato, pea, gram, mustard, linseed and
barseem. In electric well commands, the area allocated under wheat, potato, pea, barseem is lower for pump
owners whereas gram, mustard, linseed and barley area allocation is higher for water buyers.
In diesel well commands, pump owners allocate larger share of their cropped area under winter crops
as compared to water buyers. Such sharp difference is not seen in case of electric well commands. This could
be because the hourly rate for irrigation water charged by diesel pump owners is four times higher than that
charged by electric pump owners. During the summer season, major cops grown in electric pump commands
are green fodder, sunflower and vegetables. While all these crops are grown by the electric pump owners, only
green fodder is grown by water buyers. In diesel well commands, crops grown during summer season are green
fodder and vegetables. Both diesel well owners and water buyers here allocate some area under green fodder.
4.4 Cropping pattern in North Gujarat
In the case of north Gujarat, major crops grown by the tubewell owners under both tariff regimes are
green fodder (fodder bajra and alfalfa), foodgrain crops (jowar and bajra), pulses (black gram and green gram),
groundnut and cash crops (cluster bean, cotton and castor). The farmers of this region allocate small area under
Area Water source Average (rs/m3) Range (rs/m3)
Western UP Electric Pump owner 0.18 0.10 - 0.30
Electric pump buyers 0.65 0.52 - 0.84
Diesel pump owners 1.38 0.99 – 2.04
Diesel pump buyers 2.81 2.07 – 3.63
North Gujarat Metered connections 1.07 0.14 – 3.91
Non metered connections 1.60 0.19 – 4.27
South Bihar Electric Pump owner 0.77 0.17 – 3.39
Electric pump buyers 0.70 0.31 - 0.92
Diesel pump owners 1.87 1.51 – 2.95
Diesel pump buyers 2.15 1.84 – 2.42
Table 3: Cost Estimates based on well discarge421
Table 4: Cropping Pattern of Well Owner and Water Buyers under Different Energy Regime, Eastern
Uttar Pradesh
Name of the Crops
Electric Pump Diesel Pump

















Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
green fodder throughout the year (major crops are alfalfa, fodder bajra and chikudi). Table 5 gives the cropping
pattern of well owners in north Gujarat.
During kharif, tube well owners under pro-rata tariff regime allocate slightly larger percentage of the
cropped area under cotton, castor and fodder bajra. During winter, tube well owners under flat rate tariff regime
are allocating more area under green fodder, wheat and mustard. The tube well owners under pro-rata tariff
regime allocate slightly larger area under cumin, which is a high valued and sensitive cash crop. The major crops
Kharif Season
1.   Paddy 0.71 11.51 0.36 14.81 1.55 26.18 0.91 22.14
2.   Bajra 0.32 5.15 0.14 5.85 0.23 3.85 0.13 3.25
3.   Maize 0.24 3.97 0.12 4.78 0.23 3.81 - -
4.   Lady’s Finger 0.32 5.18 0.23 9.53 - -
5.   Other Vegetables 0.32 5.30 0.17 7.08 0.14 2.41 0.34 8.35
6.   Arhar - - - - - 0.30 7.42
7.   Black gram 0.27 4.39 0.11 4.68 - - 0.11 2.78
8.   Green gram 0.37 6.06 - - - - 0.11 2.78
9.   Sesamum 0.08 1.30 0.06 2.34 0.23 3.85 0.11 2.78
10. Groundnut 0.33 5.34 - - - - - -
11. Sugarcane 0.11 1.77 0.06 2.34 0.16 2.68 - -
12. Chary (Green fodder) 0.16 2.60 0.08 3.20 0.11 1.89 0.10 2.38
Rabi Season
1.  Wheat 0.67 10.94 0.29 12.00 1.27 21.48 0.83 20.29
2.  Barley 0.23 3.73 0.08 3.28 - - 0.09 2.23
3.  Pea 0.23 3.80 0.13 5.47 0.34 5.73 0.17 4.08
4.  Gram 0.17 2.85 0.04 1.46 0.42 7.02 0.20 4.84
5.  Mustard 0.70 10.06 0.53 4.45 0.27 4.55 0.14 3.50
6.  Linseed 0.06 0.93 - - 0.34 5.78 0.10 2.50
7.  Potato 0.50 8.15 0.29 11.94 0.37 6.24 0.23 5.57
8.  Barseem (Green fodder ) 0.07 1.14 0.05 1.89 0.06 1.05 0.07 1.64
Summer Season
1.  Sunflower 0.10 1.58 - - - - - -
2.  Vegetables 0.11 1.86 - - 0.11 1.93 - -
3.  MP chary (Green fodder) 0.15 2.38 0.12 4.89 0.09 1.55 0.14 3.48
Gross Cropped Area (GCA) 6.13 100.00 2.44 100.0 5.92 100.00 4.10 100.0422
7 Two types of alfalfa are grown in the region: [1] the first one is sown during winter and is harvested by month of April i.e., the crop
duration is about 6 months; and [2] the second one is Kachchhi alfalfa, which has a duration of nearly three years. Those farmers
having good irrigation facility grow Kachchhi alfalfa get green fodder through out the year.
grown during summer season are green fodder (Kachchhi alfalfa7 and fodder bajra) and bajra. The area allocated
by flat and unit pricing tariff tubewells owners under the bajra crop is about 10% of the gross cropped area.
Electric Pump Electric Pump
Season Name of the Crops Owner – Flat Rate Owner – Unit  Pricing
Area % to Area % to
(ha) GCA (ha) GCA
1.   Fodder Bajra 0.26 1.58 0.39 2.91
2.   Alfalfa (Green Fodder) 0.36 2.23 0.41 3.05
3.   Jowar 1.07 6.58 1.01 7.52
4.   Bajra 0.98 6.03 0.89 6.63
Kharif 5.   Black gram 0.81 5.00 0.53 3.90
6.   Green gram 0.76 4.69 0.87 6.47
7.   Groundnut 0.95 5.82 0.51 3.81
8.   Cluster bean 0.85 5.24 1.06 7.87
9.   Cotton 0.63 3.87 0.61 4.52
10. Castor 1.17 7.17 1.10 8.17
1.   Alfalfa (Green Fodder) 0.33 2.01 0.28 2.10
2.   Chekudi (Green Fodder) 1.33 8.15 0.23 1.69
3.   Wheat 1.27 7.82 0.96 7.14
Rabi 4.   Barley 0.23 1.41 0.63 4.66
5.  Rajgaro 0.91 5.62 0.73 5.39
6.  Mustard 1.14 7.00 0.75 5.53
7.  Cumin 0.90 5.50 0.81 6.04
1.  Alfalfa 0.38 2.35 - -
Summer 2.  Fodder Bajra 0.25 1.55 0.41 3.01
3.  Bajra 1.69 10.37 1.29 9.58
Gross Cropped Area (GCA) 16.27 100.00 13.49 100.00
Table 5: Cropping Pattern of Well Owner under Different Energy Pricing Regime, North Gujarat
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
4.5 Cropping Pattern in South Bihar
Cropping pattern of well owners and water buyers under different energy regimes and area allocated by
the farmers under different crops in south Bihar are presented in Table 6. In the region, very high monsoon rain
results in submergence of most of the cultivated land during kharif season. During this season, farmers grow
two crops viz., paddy and green fodder, with larger area under paddy. Out of the gross cropped area, nearly 38%
is under paddy and less than 3% is under green fodder. During winter, farmers grow wheat, gram, mustard,
barseem (fodder), vegetables (potato, radish and carrot) and coriander. Largest area is under wheat. During
summer, farmers grow onion, maize and green fodder.423
There is very little difference in Kharif cropping pattern found between well owners and water buyers
in electric well commands or diesel well commands. During winter, water buyers in electric well commands
cultivate gram and carrot. Diesel pump owners and water buyers in both diesel and electric well commands
allocate larger area for potato. During summer, only diesel pump owners and water buyers in their commands
cultivate green fodder. In general, electric pump owners allocate larger area under different crops as compared
to electric pump water buyers. There is a similar trend in case of diesel pump command areas.
Table 6: Cropping Pattern of Well Owner and Water Buyer in Diesel and Electric Well Commands, South Bihar
Plain
Name of the Crops
Electric Pump Diesel Pump

















Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
4.6. Irrigation Water Application and Crop Water Productivity
In this section, we present the estimates of irrigation water application, physical water productivity (kg/
m3) of main and by-products and net water productivity in economic terms (Rs/m3) of different crops grown by
electric/diesel pump owners and water buyers in their commands. Higher physical productivity of water use for
a given crop indicates more efficient use of irrigation water through on farm water management or better farm
management through better agronomic input.
Eastern Uttar Pradesh: Electric well commands
Table 7 presents the estimates of irrigation water dosage productivity of water in physical (kg/m3) and
economic terms (Rs/m3) under electric pump ownership and irrigation water purchase for villages in eastern
Kharif Season
1. Paddy 0.751 38.97 0.467 38.42 1.083 37.68 0.541 38.02
2. Masureya (Green fodder) 0.028 1.47 0.016 1.34 0.077 2.69 0.026 1.83
3. Maize (Green fodder) 0.004 0.22 0.002 0.17 - - - -
Rabi Season
1. Wheat 0.474 24.63 0.351 28.88 0.625 21.74 0.315 22.17
2. Potato 0.134 6.98 0.120 9.86 0.343 11.94 0.145 10.17
3. Barseem (Green fodder) 0.042 2.18 0.024 1.97 0.066 2.31 0.029 2.05
4. Mustard 0.059 3.05 - - 0.207 7.21 0.077 5.39
5. Gram - - 0.011 0.89 - - - -
6. Radish 0.025 1.32 0.023 1.85 - - - -
7. Carrot - - 0.002 0.17 - - - -
8. Coriander - - - - 0.019 0.65 - -
Summer Season
1. Onion 0.353 18.32 0.170 14.03 0.356 12.38 0.218 15.36
2. Maize 0.055 2.87 0.029 2.42 0.093 3.25 0.068 4.79
3. NP Chary (Green fodder) - - - - 0.005 0.16 0.003 0.22
Gross Cropped Area (GCA) 1.93 100.0 1.22 100.0 2.88 100.0 1.42 100.0424
Uttar Pradesh. In case of electric pump owner, total amount of irrigation water applied for crop production is
higher as compared to irrigation water buyers. For most of the crops, both physical and economic productivity
of water are higher for water buyers than their water-selling counterparts.





Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
GF: Green fodder


























1. Paddy 7.1 1.9 8.47 3.4 3.61 2.3 10.59 3.6
2. Chary (GF) 1.6 14.3 - - 0.78 26.2 - -
3. Vegetable 3.3 6.0 - 26.3 1.73 10.7 - 26.6
4. Lady’s Finger 3.2 2.3 - 10.8 2.33 3.9 - 21.2
5. Maize 2.4 2.9 19.4 9.4 1.17 5.7 18.79 18.8
6. Sesamum 0.8 1.2 - 14.2 0.57 1.3 - 9.6
7. Sugarcane 1.1 12.4 - 6.7 0.57 10.6 - 8.1
8. Bajra 3.2 1.5 10.2 4.5 1.43 4.1 30.83 10.5
9. Black gram 2.7 1.9 - 39.1 1.14 2.4 - 46.3
10. Groundnut 3.3 2.6 - 31.7 - - - -
11. Green gram 3.7 2.0 - 46.2 - - - -
Rabi Season
1. Wheat 6.7 2.4 11.3 7.8 2.93 2.6 12.36 7.6
2. Potato 5.0 5.7 - 8.6 2.91 6.0 9.6
3. Pea 2.3 1.9 - 13.5 1.33 2.1 15.0
4. Barseem 0.7 12.6 - - 0.46 12.3 -
5. Gram 1.8 1.8 - 27.03 0.36 1.6 31.1
6. Mustard 1.6 1.4 - 10.8 1.20 1.4 11.4
7. Linseed 0.6 0.9 - 4.4 - - - -
8. Barley 2.3 3.4 16.0 9.1 0.80 4.3 14.57 14.6
Summer Season
1. MP chary 1.5 11.1 - - 1.19 10.8 - -
2. Sunflower 1.0 1.0 - 3.40 - - - -
3. Vegetables 1.1 2.4 - 15.15 - - - -425
Eastern Uttar Pradesh: Diesel well commands
Similar values for diesel pump owners and water buyers is presented in Table 8. The cropping pattern of
pump owners and water buyers is almost the same, except that water buyers do not grow sugarcane and maize.
To economize on irrigation water, water buyers cultivate water efficient crops such as arhar, black gram and
green gram during kharif season. The cropping pattern during winter is same for diesel pump owner and water
buyers. During summer season, only pump owners grow vegetables.
Table 8: Water Use, and Water Productivity in Physical and Economic Terms under Diesel Well Command,
Eastern Uttar Pradesh
Name of the Crops
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
GF: Green fodder






























1. Paddy 15.53 1.86 8.50 2.62 9.09 2.39 8.49 2.92
2. Chary (GF) 1.12 18.44 - - 0.98 29.74 - -
3. Vegetables 1.43 0.77 - 0.37 3.43 1.94 - 25.26
4. Arhar - - - 3.05 3.54 - 46.49
5. Maize 2.26 2.56 20.05 13.20 - - - -
6. Sesamum 2.29 0.89 - 17.39 1.14 0.88 - 17.72
7. Sugarcane 1.59 10.13 - 2.50 - - - -
8. Bajra 2.29 3.43 15.54 7.47 1.33 4.41 22.24 17.83
9. Black gram - - - - 1.14 1.30 - 28.69
10. Green gram - - - - 1.14 1.73 - 59.98
Rabi Season
1. Wheat 12.74 2.57 13.34 6.22 8.33 3.50 14.40 7.80
2. Potato 3.70 7.23 - 17.87 2.29 7.40 - -
3. Pea 3.40 1.56 - 12.19 1.67 1.74 - 12.36
4. Barseem (GF) 0.62 15.97 - - 0.67 14.57 - -
5. Gram 4.16 1.58 - 15.33 1.99 1.82 - 17.78
6. Mustard 2.70 1.56 - 10.87 1.44 1.15 - 11.99
7. Linseed 3.43 1.36 - 13.70 1.03 1.53 - 16.77
8. Barley - - - - 0.91 5.61 14.90 14.90
Summer Season
1. MP Chary (GF) 0.92 10.68 - 1.43 11.77 - -
2. Vegetable 1.14 2.41 - 17.49 - - - -426
Table 8 shows that the water buyers in diesel well commands apply less amount of water to their crops
as compared to their water selling counterparts. Further, the physical productivity of water (kg/m3) and water
productivity in economic terms (Rs/m3) is higher for water buyers as compared to diesel pump owners for all
the crops.
 North Gujarat: Flat and Unit energy Pricing Regimes
Table 9 presents similar data for different energy pricing regimes. Electric pump owners pay marginal
cost for electricity and therefore maintain higher water productivity in both physical and economic terms for all
the crops.
Table 9 Water Use, and Water Productivity in Physical and Economic Terms under Flat and Unit Energy Pricing
Regime, North Gujarat
Name of the Crops
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data            GF: Green Fodder




























1. Rajka Bajra 2.57 8.24 - - 3.93 10.83 - -
2. Alfalfa (GF) 3.63 5.42 - - 4.11 5.64 - -
3. Jowar 10.71 2.76 4.06 8.27 10.14 2.26 1.51 6.62
4. Bajra 9.81 1.00 3.48 5.13 8.94 1.45 2.14 6.39
5. Black gram 8.13 1.07 - 15.14 5.26 1.50 - 16.75
6. Green gram 7.62 0.91 - 10.85 8.73 0.98 - 11.20
7. Groundnut 9.47 0.58 - 3.58 5.14 0.56 - 4.68
8. Cluster 8.52 1.02 - 9.09 10.62 1.11 - 9.37
9. Cotton 6.29 0.41 - 5.34 6.10 1.15 - 19.28
10. Castor 11.66 0.59 - 5.06 11.02 0.62 - 6.52
Rabi Season
1. Alfalfa (GF) 3.27 3.65 - - 2.83 5.71 - -
2. Chekudi (GF) 13.26 2.96 - - 2.29 5.45 - -
3. Wheat 12.72 0.82 2.64 4.64 9.63 0.91 2.08 5.17
4. Barley 2.29 0.47 9.33 0.70 6.29 1.11 2.89 6.17
5. Rajgaro 9.14 0.56 - 4.11 7.27 0.89 - 8.50
6. Mustard 11.38 2.86 - 22.25 7.46 2.10 - 23.50
7. Cumin 8.95 0.82 - 36.71 8.14 0.99 - 47.71
Summer Season
1. Alfalfa (GF) 3.82 2.30 - - - - - -
2. Rajka Bajra 2.53 3.27 - - 4.06 8.15 - -
3. Bajra 16.87 1.95 2.36 6.43 12.92 1.94 3.02 7.31427
The mean values of irrigation water dosage and water productivity in physical and economic terms for
both pump owners and water buyers in electric pump command area in south Bihar plain for all crops are
presented in Table 10. Water buyers apply less water to their crops, and maintain higher physical water produc-
tivity values for many crops in comparison to electric well owners (paddy, maize, barseem, onion and summer
maize). However, they maintain lower water productivity in economic terms for most of the crops, except
radish and onion. This could be due to the higher cost of irrigation water, which eventually reduces the values of
numerator of water productivity. Table 11 presents figures of water use and water productivity of diesel well
commands of south Bihar plains - both in physical and economic terms.
Diesel pump owners and water buyers grow almost similar crops. For all crops except onion and
summer green fodder, water buyers in diesel well commands secure higher physical water productivity as
compared to pump owners. Again, for all crops except onion, the water buyers secure higher water produc-
tivity in economic terms as compared to pump owners.
Comparison of net water productivity (Rs./m
3) figures between well owners and water buyers in both
electric and diesel well commands in two locations viz., eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar planes and
farmers with metered and farmers with non metered connections in north Gujarat show the following trends-
A) Net water productivity of water buyers from electric pumps is more both in east UP and south Bihar.
B) Net water productivity of electric pump owners under flat rate provision is comparatively less than
those under unit price tariff.
Table 10: Water Use, and Water Productivity in Physical and Economic Terms under Electric Well Command,
South Bihar Plain
Name of the Crops
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
GF: Green Fodder






























1. Paddy 7.51 2.5 12.90 6.35 4.67 2.69 12.60 8.4
2. Masureya 0.40 11.7 - - 0.35 10.15 - -
3. Maize (GF) 2.50 20.5 - - 1.25 27.34 - -
Rabi Season
1. Wheat 4.82 1.8 8.87 5.56 3.51 1.76 7.43 5.8
2. Potato 1.92 13.1 - 43.16 2.00 11.74 - 41.8
3. Barseem 0.56 10.4 - - 0.40 11.91 - -
4. Mustard 2.67 1.8 - 20.16 - - - -
5. Gram - - - - 0.93 0.66 - 9.2
6. Radish 1.27 10.0 - 13.92 0.96 9.59 - 18.5
Summer Season
1. Onion 4.60 4.4 - 18.48 2.18 5.40 - 23.2
2. Maize 2.07 5.9 - 21.66 1.76 6.86 - 19.1428
Table 11: Water Use, and Water Productivity in Physical and Economic Terms under Diesel Well Command,
South Bihar Plain
Name of the Crops
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data       GF: Green Fodder





























C) Water productivity of electric pump owners in economic terms is less than that of diesel pump
owners.
D) Economic water productivity of water buyers from electric pumps is less than those buying water
from diesel pump sets.
4.7 Livestock Water Productivity
4.7.1  Feed and Fodder Use
Farmers of eastern Uttar Pradesh keep buffalos, crossbred cows and indigenous cows. Most of the
farmers in the region keep a combination of livestock i.e., buffalo with indigenous cow or buffalo with cross-
bred cow. The reason behind this is that while buffalo milk fetches higher price, cow milk is used for domestic
consumption. Green fodder includes chary, barseem and MP chary. Bhusa (which is a concentrate of barley
flour and mustarg cake) is used as dry fodder. In general, farmers feed larger quantity of green fodder for
milking animals.
Weighted average of feed and fodder input to livestock worked out for the entire animal lifecycle by
farmers for west Uttar Pradesh are presented in Table 12.
Similar estimates for livestock inputs for farmers in diesel well command in eastern Uttar Pradesh were
carried out. In case of pump owners, the average amount of feed and fodder fed to livestock were about 36,
43.35 and 31.71 kg/day/animal for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow, respectively. The correspond-
ing numbers for water buyers were 37.5, 38.06 and 33.72 kg/day/per animal, respectively.
Kharif Season
1. Paddy 8.96 2.40 15.13 7.50 5.41 2.98 19.77 9.56
2. Masureya 1.08 8.8 - - 0.74 10.92 - -
Rabi Season
1. Wheat 5.88 2.0 8.71 5.97 3.16 2.27 9.27 6.80
2. Potato 3.89 12.9 - 44.57 1.81 13.92 - 49.83
3. Barseem 0.89 12.7 - - 0.60 16.03 - -
4. Mustard 3.89 1.5 - 16.18 1.92 1.60 - 16.25
5. Coriander 2.81 2.3 - 38.72 - - - -
Summer Season
1. Onion 3.70 5.8 - 21.50 3.06 5.34 - 21.27
2. Maize 2.24 5.3 - 17.05 1.64 7.65 - 31.84
3. MP Chary 0.92 8.9 - - 0.94 7.46 - -429
In north Gujarat, estimates of average feed and fodder input were made separately for farmers with
metered and non-metered power connections. Farmers with metered power connection on average fed 13.68,
15.77 and 9.39 kg/day/animal of green fodder and 14.96, 16.32 and 12.13 kg/day/animal dry fodder to buffalo,
crossbred cow and indigenous cow respectively. Quantity estimates were greater for farmers with non metered
connections at 19.56, 23.18, and 9.25 kg/day/animal green fodder and 21.78, 25.64 and 20.95 kg/day/animal dry
fodder to buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow, respectively.
Similar estimates are available separately for farmers in the electric well commands and diesel well
commands for south Bihar. The average amount of feed and fodder supplied by pump owner farmers in electric
well commands to buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow are 24.07, 24.75 and 16.09 kg/day/animal,
respectively. The corresponding figures for water buyer-farmers in electric well commands are 21.92, 33.37
and 19.81 kg/day/animal, respectively. In case of diesel well commands, the average feed and fodder fed by
diesel pump owner to buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow are 35.34, 25.82 and 21.05 kg/day/animal,
respectively. The corresponding figures for water buyers are 26.31, 27.56 and 29 kg/day/animal, respectively.
In general, in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar, water buyers (in both diesel and electric well
commands) and farmers with non metered connections fed more input to their cattle.
4.7.2  Average Milk Production
The estimates of average milk production from dairy animals for electric well owners, worked out for
the entire animal life cycle, are 2.91, 4.64 and 1.81 lt/day/animal for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow
respectively. This is higher than that for water buyers, in whose case the figures are 2.64, 4.08 and 1.89 lt/day/
animal. The corresponding estimates for farmers in the diesel well commands are; for well owners, 2.08, 4.01
and 1.95 lt and for water buyers, the values are 2.23, 3.23 and 2.01, for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous
cow, respectively.
The estimates of average daily milk production in north Gujarat region are as follows. In case of farmers
who have metered electricity connections, the average milk production from buffalo, crossbred cow and indig-
enous cow are 5.14, 7.5 and 1.91 lt/animal/, respectively. Same estimates for non metered connections are
higher at 6.96, 9.32 and 6.43 lt. Such higher yields in the case of farmers with flat rate connections are due to the
higher amount of feed and fodder that they are providing to dairy animals.
The estimates of average milk production for different dairy animals in electric well commands in South
Bihar are as follows. For pump owners, the average milk production figures from buffalo, crossbred cow and
indigenous cow are 2.0, 2.36 and 0.79 lt/day/animal, respectively. In the case of water buyers, they are 1.86,
2.97 and 0.88 lt/day/animal. The figures for farmers of diesel well commands are 1.69, 3.53 and 0.96 lt/day/
animal respectively, whereas, in case of water buyers, the corresponding values are 1.68, 2.30 and 1.18 lt/day/
animal.
Total Green Fodder 14.09 14.88 13.61 13.77 19.49 14.81
Total dry fodder 10.11 12.07 9.58 8.89 12.73 9.29
Total Concentrates 1.19 1.53 1.13 1.01 1.78 1.17
Table 12: Average Feed and Fodder Used Based on Lifecycle of Animal in eastern Uttar Pradesh
Feed and Fodder Use (kg/day/animal)











4.7.3 Water Use for Milk Production
The estimates of the volume of water used for milk production and gross water productivity in milk
production in economic terms for buffalo, crossbred and indigenous cows for the sample farmers in the electric
well commands in Eastern Uttar Pradesh are presented in Table 13. Dairy farmers, who own pump-sets, use
larger quantity of water for producing green and dry fodder, in comparison to water buyers. However, the
amount of water embedded in the concentrate used for dairy production is higher for water buyers. The net
result is that the gross water productivity for milk production is higher for electric pump owner as compared to
irrigation water buyers.
Table 13: Water Use for Milk Production in Electric Pump Command Area, Eastern Uttar Pradesh (m3/day)
Green Fodder 1.11 1.17 1.08 0.96 1.36 1.03
Dry Fodder 0.89 1.07 0.85 0.72 1.03 0.75
Concentrates 0.61 0.77 0.57 0.49 0.94 0.58
Drinking Water (m3) 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.019 0.013
Total Water Use (m3) 2.63 3.02 2.50 2.19 3.35 2.38
Milk Production (Lt) 2.91 4.64 1.81 2.64 4.08 1.89
Milk WP (Lt/m3) 1.11 1.54 0.72 1.20 1.22 0.79
Gross WP (Rs/m3) 11.95 15.52 6.72 12.97 12.31 7.35
Types of Feed & Fodder










For diesel well commands, the estimates of volume of water used for milk production by water sellers
are 3.02 m3, 3.48 m3 and 2.68 m3/day/animal for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow respectively,
whereas in case of irrigation water buyers, the corresponding figures are 3.00 m3, 3.21 m3 and 2.64 m3/day/
animal. The physical productivity of water for milk production are 0.69, 1.15 and 0.73 lt/m3, respectively for
pump owner and 0.66, 1.08 and 0.58 lt/m3 for water buyers. The average values of gross water productivity in
milk production in economic terms from buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow are Rs. 11.03/m3, 16.13/
m3 and 10.95/m3 respectively for pump owner and Rs 11.93/m3, 14.06/m3 and 11.38/m3 for water buyers. In
nutshell, the physical productivity of water for milk production, and water productivity in economic terms are
higher for pump owners than that for water buyers.
For north Gujarat farmers, the estimates of embedded water used for milk production and the water
productivity in physical and economic terms are as follows. In the case of farmers who have flat rate connec-
tions, average volume of water used for milk production from buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow/day/
animal are 9.77 m3, 10.43 m3 and 8.39 m3, respectively. The corresponding average values of physical produc-
tivity of water in milk production (lt/m3) are 0.53, 0.72 and 0.23, respectively and of gross water productivity in
economic terms (Rs/m3) are is 8.48, 10.43 and 2.96, respectively. In the case of well owner having metered
connections, the average values of total volume of water used for milk production are 14.63 m3, 17.39 m3 and
10.90 m3/day/animal for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow respectively. The corresponding values of
physical water productivity for milk production (lt/m3) are 0.48, 0.54 and 0.59, respectively and of gross water
productivity in economic terms (Rs/m3) are 7.39, 6.47 and 8.85, respectively for buffalo, cross bred cows and
indigenous cows respectively.
The estimates of embedded water used in milk production in electric well commands for south Bihar
plains are as follows. The electric pump owners use an average of 3.96 m3, 4.92 m3 and 2.81 m3 of water per
animal per day for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow, respectively. The corresponding figures for431
water buyers in their commands are 4.09 m3, 5.36 m3 and 3.37 m3, respectively. The physical productivity of
water used in milk production (lt/m3) from buffalo, crossbred cow, and indigenous cow in the case of water
buyers are 0.45, 0.48 and 0.28. The corresponding values of gross water productivity in economic terms (Rs/
m3) are 7.01, 6.66 and 3.95, respectively.
 The estimates available for farmers in diesel well commands are as follows. The diesel pump owners
use an average of 4.88, 3.96 and 2.73 m3 of water/animal/day for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow,
respectively. For water buyers, the corresponding figures are 3.62, 3.18 and 3.04, respectively. The physical
productivity of water for milk production (lt/m3) in case of pump owners for buffalo, cross bred cow and
indigenous cow are 0.35, 0.90 and 0.50, respectively. The corresponding figures for water buyers are 0.46, 0.72
and 0.39, respectively. The average values of water productivity in milk production in economic terms (Rs/m3)
are 4.48, 10.60 and 7.00, respectively for buffalo, cross bred crow and indigenous cow. The corresponding
figures for water buyers are 6.50, 8.52 and 5.45, respectively.
4.7.4  Net Water Productivity in Economic Terms
The net water productivity in economic terms for dairy production was estimated by considering the
cost of milk production, which includes the cost of production of dry fodder, green fodder, cattle feed and other
expenses for maintaining dairy animals in the water productivity analysis. In estimating the effective water
productivity in milk production, the amount of water embedded in cattle feed used by farmers, which is im-
ported, is subtracted from the value of denominator. The reason is that it is not counted in any water allocation
decision taken by the farmers as a response to the pricing changes. The total cost of green fodder, dry fodder
and concentrate, the income from milk and cow dung and total and effective water use for dairy production
were estimated. Based on these data, both the net water productivity and effective net water productivity in
economic terms were estimated for all the three locations (i.e., for well owners, and water buyers in electric and
diesel well commands in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar and electric well owners with and without
metered connections in north Gujarat).
The results for farmers in electric commands in Eastern Uttar Pradesh are presented in Table 14.
Table 14 shows that well owners secure higher net water productivity in milk production than water
buyers for all types of livestock. Analysis of similar estimates for diesel well commands in eastern Uttar Pradesh
shows the following. The values of net water productivity in economic terms for the pump owners are 1.74,
Table 14: Water Productivity in Economic Terms in Milk Production, Electric Pump, Eastern Uttar Pradesh
Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data
1. Green fodder (Rs.) 3.29 3.50 3.29 4.52 6.4 4.9
2. Dry fodder (Rs.) 3.03 3.62 3.03 2.67 3.82 2.79
3. Concentrates (Rs.) 6.51 8.39 6.51 5.54 9.58 6.38
4. Total expenditure (Rs/day) 12.84 15.52 12.84 12.73 19.80 14.03
5. Milk production (lt) 2.91 4.64 1.81 2.64 4.50 1.89
6. Gross income from milk (Rs) 31.39 46.86 16.83 28.44 45.48 17.51
7. Income from dung  (Rs/day) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.5 0.5
8. Gross income (Rs/day) 31.89 47.36 17.33 28.94 45.98 18.01
9. Net income (Rs/day) 19.05 31.84 4.50 16.21 26.18 3.98
10. Net water productivity (Rs/m3) 7.25 10.55 1.80 7.39 7.82 1.67
Types of Feed & Fodder











6.89 and 0.46 for buffalo, cross bred cow and indigenous cows, respectively. The corresponding values for
water buyers are 0.43, 1.8 and -1.72. Comparing electric and diesel well commands, it appears that pump
owners in electric well commands secure highest effective net water productivity in economic terms, followed
by water buyers in their command, diesel pump owners and lowest for buyers of water from diesel pump
owners.
In north Gujarat, the average values of effective net water productivity in economic terms for milk
production from buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow under flat energy pricing regime are Rs. 3.73/m3,
Rs. 5.88/m3 and Rs. -1.85/m3, respectively. In case of farmers under pro-rata pricing regime, the values are
Rs. 3.31/m3, Rs. 2.29/m3 and Rs. 3.37/m3, respectively. It is clear that over all effective net water productivity
is higher under pro-rata pricing regime.
In south Bihar, the estimates of average effective net water productivity in milk production for electric
well commands for electric pump well owner are Rs. 2.18/m3, 1.96/m3 and -1.0/m3 and for water buyers are the
values are Rs. 1.65/m3, 3.89/m3 and -0.64/m3 for buffalo, crossbred cow and indigenous cow respectively. For
diesel well commands, pump owner’s effective net water productivity in economic terms (Rs/m3) are -0.47,
5.68 and -250; and for water buyers are 0.07, 2.09 and -1.26, for buffalo, cross bred cow and indigenous cow,
respectively.
4.8  Farm Level Water Productivity
Using more water means paying more for the pump rental services. Farmers should try and economize
on the use of water, though it is not a scarce resource in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar. Farms are the
unit for many investment decisions by farmers in agriculture including water allocation decisions. They try to
optimize water allocation over the entire farm, rather than individual crops, to maximize their returns. Hence, the
impact of power pricing on the efficiency with which water is used by farmers should be analyzed by looking at
the water productivity for the entire farming system.
Our analysis clearly shows that the farm level water productivity is much higher for water buyers in
diesel well commands in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar (Table 15). In electric well commands, the
differences are not statistically significant. Here, the marginal cost of using water is too small for water buyers
(Rs. 0.65/m3), to create significant impacts on productivity. The farm level water productivity is much higher
for farmers who are confronted with marginal cost of unit electricity in north Gujarat as compared to those who
pay for electricity based on connected load. The water productivity improvement in highest in eastern Uttar
Pradesh in the diesel well commands, where the water buyers’ marginal cost of using irrigation service is Rs.
2.81/m3. Water productivity difference is also quite substantial in north Gujarat between farmers with flat rate
connection and those with metered connections.
Further, comparison between electric well owners and diesel well owners in south Bihar also
substantiates the earlier point that positive marginal cost promotes efficient use of water at the farm level. The
data from eastern Uttar Pradesh does not corroborate with this. The reason is that the locations where electric
well commands are located are not comparable with those of diesel well commands in terms of depth to ground-
North Gujarat Banaskantha 6.20 7.90 NA NA
Well Owner Water Buyer Well Owner Water Buyer
Eastern Uttar Pradesh Varanasi and
Mirzapur 10.95 11.18 8.67 12.89
South Bihar Plains Patna 9.28 10.13 11.97 12.43
Table 15: Farming System Level Water Productivity in Agriculture under Different Pricing Regimes
Name of the Regions Name of the district
Electric Well Command Diesel Well Command
Flat Rate Unit Pricing  Well owner Water buyers433
water table, soil conditions and moisture conditions. The diesel well commands are located in uplands with poor
soils, whereas the electric well commands are located inside the flood plains of the Ganges with high water table
depth, fertile soils and good moisture conditions during winter.
4.9 Impact of Different Modes of Energy Pricing on Equity in Access to Groundwater
As discussed in the methodology, the impacts of energy pricing on access equity in groundwater can be
examined by studying how the increase in cost of production of groundwater influences the price at which
water is traded. This can be studied by analyzing the changes in monopoly price ratios8 for water traded in the
market with change in mode of pricing. In the case of north Gujarat, we had a real life situation of farmers
shifting from flat rate system to the pro-rata system of electricity consumption. However, these farmers are not
into water trading. Hence, the water markets in electric and diesel well commands of eastern Uttar Pradesh and
south Bihar were compared vis-à-vis the monopoly price ratios and the volume of water traded.
Through this analysis, we would test one dominant hypothesis by Shah (1993) that under flat rate
system of pricing, well owners would have a strong incentive to pump out more water and as a result, the price
at which water is traded in the market would come down, and come close to the cost of production of water.
Kumar (2007) had challenged this hypothesis arguing that it is rather the number of potential sellers against the
number of potential buyers citing evidences from Mussafarpur in Bihar.
Table 16 shows that in eastern Uttar Pradesh, the MPR (monopoly price ratio) was higher in the case of
electric well commands than that in diesel pump well commands. While the price charged by electric pump
owners was 3.6 times more than their cost of pumping, the price charged by diesel pump owners is only 1.8
times higher than their cost of pumping. In south Bihar, the trend is just the opposite. The average price charged
by electric well owners is lower than the implicit cost of pumping water (Rs.0.70/m3 against Rs. 0.77/m3).




Uttar Pradesh Mirzapur 0.65 3.50 2.81 1.85
South Bihar Plains Patna 0.70 0.90 2.15 1.15
Table 16: Selling Price of Well Water and the Monopoly Price Ratio under different Pricing Regimes
Name of the Regions Name of the district Selling Price of Water and Monopoly Price Ratio in
Electric Well Command Diesel Well Command
Selling Price MPR Selling Price MPR
These are based on average figures of cost and price. A look at the cost and price figures for individual
wells brings out a different picture. A few farmers have very high implicit cost of pumping groundwater, higher
than the selling price. The reason is that the capital cost of the well and the pump set constitutes a major chunk
of the cost, and the unit cost becomes high only because the wells run for fewer hours9. But, the monopoly price
charged by many other farmers is higher under flat rate system for electric wells, as compared to those for diesel
wells. These are farmers who have larger holdings due to which the pumping becomes very low.
Another interesting phenomenon found in both electric and diesel well commands is that the selling price
of water is more or less same across the farmers, though the unit cost of pumping water varies across farmers.
8 It is the ratio of the price of water and its actual cost of production incurred by the well owner.
9 Such an approach to working out the unit cost, in which the capital cost is considered along with O & M, is valid only in long term
marginal cost calculations. But, in reality the farmers do not consider this cost in their decision making framework is for short time
duration. Therefore, the real marginal cost of pumping is very low, which means the MPR is high.434
The selling price is decided by the market conditions irrespective of the cost farmers incur for pumping water
(Kumar et al., 2001). Fewer numbers of potential sellers against a large number of potential buyers would
increase the monopoly power of well owners. This is due to the poor transferability of water. Perhaps this is
what is happening in the village with electric pumps in eastern Uttar Pradesh. On the other hand, presence of
large number of sellers against a few buyers would reduce the monopoly power of well owners. They would be
forced to sell water at prices conditioned by the market (Kumar, 2007).  Perhaps this is what is happening in the
village with electric pumps in south Bihar.
In nutshell, the mode of pricing of electricity does not influence the monopoly prices being charged by
well owners in the market. On the other hand, the flat rate pricing puts large well owners in a very advantageous
position as they could bring down their implicit unit cost of pumping groundwater.
4.10 Groundwater Pumpage
Often the distinction between efficiency and sustainability is not made (Moench and Kumar, 1993).
Pricing would introduce efficiency, but may not ensure sustainability of resource use (Kumar, 2005). The total
amount of groundwater pumpage per unit of cultivated area is determined by the cropping pattern and the
cropping intensity. Increased allocation of cultivable area under highly water intensive crops would increase the
demand for irrigation water by a farmer. Hence, total pumpage per unit cultivated area could be a good indicator
of the sustainability impacts of change in mode of pricing on groundwater. However, farmers with very small
land holding size are more likely to intensify cropping, which would increase the total pumpage. This would
mean larger hours of pumpage per ha of cultivable area as value of numerator would increase and that of
denominator would reduce.
But, the results from three locations (see Table 17) show that the pumpage of groundwater per unit area
of cultivated land is lower for water buyers, in spite of them having lower sized holdings. The data for north
Gujarat shows that in spite of having smaller sized land holdings (2.95 ha against 3.45 ha), the pump owners
having metered connections use much less water per unit of land as compared to their counterparts having flat
rate connections (303.88 hr/year against 443.88/year). The difference in aggregate pumping is much higher
between farmers with meters and those without meters. Such a high reduction is water usage per unit of
cultivated land, which a disproportionately higher than the reduction in net return per unit of land, is made
possible through high improvements in water productivity in economic terms.
Name of the Name of Groundwater Pumpage  Diesel pump
Regions the district by Electric Pump Owners
Unit Pricing Flat Rate Well owner Water buyers
North Gujarat Banaskantha 303.88 443.88 NA NA
Groundwater Use in Electric Groundwater Use in Diesel
Well Command by Well Command by
Well Owner Water Buyer Well Owners Water Buyers
Eastern Varanasi and
Uttar Pradesh Mirzapur 175.38 183.93 222.23 148.00
South Bihar Patna 329.97 249. 74 231.11 197.91
Table 17: Average Hours of Groundwater Use by Farmers under Different pricing Regimes
But, in spite of slight reduction in pumping, the net return from unit of land is higher for water buyers
in eastern Uttar Pradesh and South Bihar plains (see Table 18). This is achieved through high enhancement in
water productivity through selection of crops that are less water consuming and high valued.435
5. MAJOR FINDINGS
The major findings emerging from the analysis of data from three locations are as follows:
1. Farmers who have metered power connection not only pay positive marginal cost of using well water, but
also pay higher cost for every unit of irrigation water (Rs/m3) as compared to their counterparts having
flat rate connections. Similarly, farmers who are buyers of water from electric pump owners and diesel
well owners in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar also pay positive marginal cost of using irrigation
water pay higher unit costs of irrigation water compared to water selling counterparts.
2. Minor differences are found in the cropping pattern of well owners and water buyers in electric and diesel
well commands; and between farmers with metered electricity connections and farmers with flat rate
connections. The water buyers (in eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar) and farmers who have metered
electricity connections allocate some amount of land for highly water-efficient crops, which are also less
water consuming.
3. Water buyers in diesel and electric well commands, and the farmers who have metered power connections
in agriculture pay for water on volumetric basis. Our analysis suggests that they secure higher water
productivity in physical terms (kg/m3) for most crops as compared to water selling well owners through:
careful use of irrigation water (as reflected in lower water application rates) and agronomic practices (as
reflected in higher yield rates). This means that when confronted with positive marginal cost of irrigation
water, farmers are encouraged to use water more efficiently.
4. Water buyers in diesel and electric well commands, and farmers who have metered electricity
connections secure higher water productivity in economic terms for many crops as compared to water
selling well owners through: careful use of irrigation water, optimizing costly inputs and obtaining higher
yield rates through farm management. This means that when confronted with positive marginal cost of
irrigation water, farmers would be encouraged to improve economic efficiency of water use.
5. The estimated values of net water productivity in economic terms estimated for dairy animals in case of
water buyers in diesel and electric well commands, and the farmers who have metered power connections
in agriculture are not higher than that of water selling well owners. This could be because the cost of
Electric Well Well owner 5.29 124587.3 7152.3 131739.6 24880
Water buyer 2.21 54637.6 6165 60802.6 27570
Diesel Well Well owner 5.66 74764.5 7429.5 82193.9 14528
Water buyer 3.79 62323.1 6260.6 68583.7 18075
Electric Well Flat Rate 13.35 369119.7 30048 768287.4 57531
Metered 11.77 311806.9 45636 669250.2 56882
Electric Well Well owner 3.14 120477 10292.6 130769.5 210345
Water buyer 1.70 61517.7 8130.9 76023.9 190031
Diesel Well Well owner 2.49 140105 9958.1 150063.6 191387
Water buyer 1.60 71810 12232.2 84042.5 197895



















Source: Author’s own estimate based on primary data436
production of animal inputs are higher in the case of water buyers due to the higher cost of production of
inputs in lieu of the higher cost of irrigation water. However, the water productivity in dairying is much
lower than that of many crops grown by both well owners and water buyers in all the locations.
6. Water buyers in diesel and electric well commands, and the farmers who have metered power connections
secure higher water productivity at the farm level as compared to water selling well owners through:
careful use of irrigation water; agronomic inputs; optimizing costly inputs for crops; and through judicious
selection of crops, cropping pattern and livestock composition, which give higher return from every unit
of water consumed. The diesel well owners also secure higher water productivity at the farm level as
compared to electric well owners, as shown by data from south Bihar. These results have two major
implications for policy: 1] when confronted with positive marginal cost of irrigation water, farmers are
encouraged to use water more efficiently over the entire farm from economic point of view; and 2] when
confronted with higher cost of irrigation water, the farmers venture into adopting farming system and
optimizing use of inputs to secure higher returns from every unit of water to offset the increase in costs
of irrigation.
7. Higher net water productivity in economic terms (Rs/m3) which farmers obtain even at high cost of
irrigation water is indicative of the fact that it is possible to keep irrigation costs high enough to induce
improved efficiency in water use in both physical and economic terms without compromising on farming
prospects.
8. Comparison of water prices charged to water buyers in diesel and electric well commands against the
cost of production of water clearly show that the monopoly price charged by well owners is not a
function of the mode of energy pricing. The farmers who are confronted with zero marginal cost of using
energy charge even higher monopoly rates for water as compared to diesel well owners. On the other
hand, the flat rate pricing puts large well owners in a very advantageous position as they could bring down
their implicit unit cost of pumping groundwater. The major policy implication of this analysis is that pro-
rata pricing of electricity would promote equity in groundwater use, if many farmers from within the
same area have access to electricity connections.
9. The water buyers in diesel and electric well commands are using much less water for every unit of net
cultivated area as compared to the farmers who are well owners. In addition, the farmers who are using
metered power connections are using less amount of water per unit of cultivated land. Such reduction in
groundwater pumping, with a disproportionately lower reduction in net return from unit of land in the
case of farmers with metered connections in north Gujarat, and no reduction in net returns in the case of
eastern Uttar Pradesh and south Bihar plains, is possible through water productivity improvement in
economic terms. This indicates that introducing marginal cost for water and electricity not only promotes
efficient use of water, as manifested by higher farm-level water productivity, but also more sustainable
use of water.
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The past one and a half decades have seen intense debate on the potential impacts of introducing
electricity pricing in the farm sector on efficiency, equity and sustainability in groundwater use, and its overall
socio-economic viability thereof. There is limited empirical work in India, which shows the potential impacts of
pro-rata pricing of electricity on efficiency in groundwater. It showed that the levels of electricity tariff that
encourage efficient and productive use of groundwater are socio-economically viable. However, the analysis
was based on comparative analysis of crop water use and water productivity data from water buyers and well
owners from a single location, rather than that of farmers who pay for electricity on pro-rata basis.
Introducing marginal cost for electricity motivates farmers to use water more efficiently at the field
level from physical, agronomic and economic point of view through careful use of irrigation water, use of better
agronomic inputs and optimizing costly inputs. Also, it would motivate farmers to use water more efficiently at437
the farm level through careful use of irrigation water in crops; better agronomic inputs; optimizing costly inputs
for crops; careful selection of crops and cropping patterns, and livestock composition that give higher return
from every unit of water and low water consuming crops. It also shows that higher cost of irrigation water
affected by higher energy cost will not lead to lower net return from every unit of water used as the farmers
modify farming system itself in response to increase in energy cost.
The analysis also shows that changing the power tariff structure from flat rate to pro-rata would not
have any adverse effects on equity of access in groundwater in terms of increasing the monopoly power of well
owners. This is because the monopoly prices are largely governed by the number of potential water sellers
against the number of potential buyers of water in an area. In addition, pro-rata pricing has significant impact in
reducing groundwater pumpage from every unit of irrigated land, which is disproportionately higher than the
reduction in net return from unit of land. This shows positive impact on sustainability of groundwater use.
The empirical evidences further reinforce the fact that the arguments against pricing are flawed. One
argument against price change is the higher marginal cost of supplying electricity under metered system, could
reduce the net social welfare as a result of reduction in: 1] demand for electricity and groundwater; and 2] net
surpluses individual farmers could generate from cropping. The second argument is that for power tariff levels
to be in the responsive region of power demand curve, prices are often so high that it may become socially
unviable.
The aggregate demand for electricity and groundwater in irrigation is a function of the demand rates
(electricity and water requirements per unit of land), and the total area under irrigation. The empirical analyses
from all locations show that the demand for water/energy per unit of land was lower for water buyers due to
increase in unit price of water/energy. However, the net income surpluses from every unit of water/energy used
increased.
Overall, the net returns reduced drastically per unit of land in south Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, and
marginally in north Gujarat. This is because in water-scarce regions like north Gujarat, farmers would not have
constraint of land in maximizing returns. With higher water productivity (Rs/m3), they would be able to maintain
the same level of net farm return as in the past with much less amount of water by slightly expanding the
irrigated area. This is more so because there is no need for regulating power supply under metered system of
pricing, whereas it is compulsory under flat rate system of pricing to control the revenue losses to the electricity
boards. Now, if one considers the positive externalities on the society due to energy and water saving due to their
efficient use, the net social welfare would be even more under pro-rata pricing.
In spite of the higher prices, the net economic returns from farming are higher for water buyers as
compared to water selling diesel and electric well owners. General argument against pro-rata pricing is that it
raises the prices at which water is traded in the market. This is based on the assumption that introduction of
marginal cost of energy, farmers would not have any special incentive to pump out extra water for sale, with the
result that the monopoly power of well owners would increase. However, evidence provided in the paper sug-
gests that the monopoly price charged by well owners is not dependent on whether well owners are confronted
with marginal cost of using electricity or not.
In sum, the evidence provided in the paper corroborates with the earlier evidence provided by Kumar
(2005) to the effect that raising pro-rata power tariff to levels that induce improvement in productivity of energy
and water use would not have any adverse impacts on the economic viability of farming. This means that
introducing high power tariff in the farm sector would be socio-economically viable.
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